Pathway to Violence

Active Shooters don’t ‘snap’. They plan. It is generally believed that persons intending to commit an act(s) of violence follow a path with identified steps on the way to engaging in their violent event. Understanding the pathway to violence allows us to observe telltale behaviors that may assist in assessing where that person of interest is, along the pathway to violence, the credibility of the threat and the imminence of a potential attack.

Progress along the pathway may be slow or fast and does not always follow the same path with each Person of Concern (POC). A POC may move forward or backward along the pathway. The pathway is not absolute. It varies with each individual. It does provide a framework for Behavioral Threat Assessment, and determining a course of action. =

Grievance is the first step on the Pathway to Violence. This may be a perceived or actual wrong that the Person of Concern has experienced. Bullying, a demotion or layoff at work, a caregiver who believes that their loved one who is a patient is not getting the care they need as quickly as they need it, all of these and more can be the grievance that drives the POC.

Ideation - When the POC cannot resolve their negative emotions or achieve justice they believe is deserved, they may progress to the idea that violence is the acceptable, or perhaps the ONLY way to achieve satisfaction. The POC in this stage comes to the ideation that their life is no longer worth living, and that violence is the only means of redress. When they reach this state, they may actually experience a sense of relief, so that a sudden change from being an angry, depressed or menacing POC, should not be presumed to be good.

Research and Planning - When the POC determines that violence is their only option, they begin to think about their plan and start researching methods, processes and resources needed to enact their violent intent.

Preparation - In preparation of the attack, the POC may acquire equipment, skills and/or any other resources to conduct the attack. They may conduct actual or virtual rehearsals of any of the aspects of their planned attack.

Breach - In this step, the POC is researching and testing the security at the target location. This may include dry runs to evaluate timing of the attack and security response; approach behaviors and stalking.

Attack - The attack my involve both or either pre-planned and opportunistically chosen targets.

A skilled Behavioral Threat Assessment Team is vital to assessing where the POC is along the Pathway to Violence, the credibility and the imminence of the threat, most importantly, the appropriate intervention, response and management of the threat and the Person of Concern.

Uvalde and Nashville School Shootings

One Year Later - What can we learn?

It’s been just over a year since the mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, where a gunman shot and killed 19 school children and two teachers on May 24, 2022.

Ten months later, on March 27, 2023, a mass shooting occurred at The Covenant School, a parochial elementary school in the Green Hills neighborhood of Nashville, Tennessee, where a shooter took the lives of three 9 year old children and three dedicated school staff.

Both of these events are horrific tragedies. 27 precious lives were ended in brief moments of ultimate violence. Their lives ended, but the pain and suffering remain with the families torn apart, surviving classmates and staff, and the community as a whole. The impact of both events sent ripples of shock and stunned disbelief across the vastness of our country. How can this happen yet again? Is there nothing that can be done to prevent these events from happening? All of the questions we ask are valid. All of them deserve answers.

Media pundits and politicians are quick to offer sound bite solutions. They offer simplistic solutions such as more gun legislation, but these are simple solutions to a multi-layered problem. These types of arguments provide the average person a solution that seems easy to comprehend, but provide a false sense of ‘doing something’ to address the problem.

Taking away guns from responsible citizens is not the answer. According to FBI data, in 2021 there were 61 active shooter incidents in total. 103 innocents were killed, which in itself is horrific. By comparison, in 2021 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports that there were 13,384 deaths resulting from drunk drivers. Despite being 219 times more horrific, there is no national conversation about taking away cars from responsible drivers. Instead, the focus is on education of the public, identifying those persons whose behavior is a threat to others, and intervening to to take them off the pathway to death and destruction through education, treatment, therapy, and where required, incarceration.

What then, can we learn from these shootings? Is there anything that can be done to prevent shootings in our schools, and keep our children safe?
In a word, yes.

While school shootings dominate news cycles, and have a massive impact on us, what doesn’t get reported by the media are the more that 2,000 averted school shootings in recent years. Studying these averted school shootings, when compared to what occurred in cases where the persons of interest succeeded in carrying out their attacks is instructive in understanding how these school shootings are, and can be prevented.
Note that in the question posed above, the operative word is ‘prevent’.  

Prevention takes place ‘left of bang’.

Left of Bang
‘Bang’ is the active incident where the event, in this case an active shooting, is actually occurring. Bang begins at the start of the event. It involves everything that occurs in response to the incident and ends when the threat is neutralized.  
‘Right of Bang’ is after the incident and involves recovery, restoration and healing.
‘Left of Bang’ encompasses everything that is done to prevent the event from occurring in the first place.

After the initial horror and shock of a shooting at a school begins to wane, our attention turns to the questions of how can we prevent another such shooting (left of bang), and if one does occur (bang), how should we respond?  

Ultimately we want to know that when we send our children off to school in the morning they will be safe and protected while there, and that they will return to us safe and well in the afternoon.

What can we learn from what occurred prior to, and during the shooting events at Robb Elementary in Uvalde and Covenant School in Nashville? What took place prior to the events, or left of bang, and the events themselves, or the bang? Let’s review step by step what occurred left of bang and during bang. What were the successes that served to mitigate the tragic effects of each event? And, what were the failures?


Left of Bang - Uvalde
The Texas House of Representatives created a special investigative committee that interviewed witnesses, reviewed crime scene photos, listened to audio and video recordings, and studied 911 calls, as well as additional documentation of the shooting.  In July 2022, the committee released an interim report of its findings, highlighting the shortcomings of the officials and first responders on the ground in Uvalde. The report noted the following:
While the school had a policy for responding to an active shooter, it did not “adequately prepare” for the risk of an active shooter on campus.
The five-foot fence around the school’s perimeter did not deter intruders, in fact the shooter threw his gear bag over the fence, and then easily climbed over it on to the school grounds.

Exterior doors were often propped open or staff otherwise circumvented the locks in place.
Locks on interior doors were on the outside of the room — meaning the solid metal classroom door with a small pane of glass could only be locked from outside using a key. This places the person locking the door in the hallway, as a potential target in sight of the shooter.

The school also did not expedite door maintenance or lock repairs. Doors to classrooms were often unable to be secured. In fact, the teacher in room 211—one of the classrooms targeted by the gunman— had alerted administrators for several months prior to the shooting that his door lock was not  locking, but a work order was never issued to address the problem.

“At a minimum, school administrators and school district police tacitly condoned this behavior as they were aware of these unsafe practices and did not treat them as serious infractions requiring immediate correction,” the report said. “In fact, the school actually suggested circumventing the locks as a solution for the convenience of substitute teachers and others who lacked their own keys.”

The committee also found that alert fatigue—due to “bailouts” may also have been a factor.  Bailouts occur when human traffickers lead law enforcement on a high-speed vehicle chase often resulting in a crash that causes migrants inside the vehicle to flee to avoid capture. The frequency of bailout alerts may have contributed to a lower sense of vigilance when responding to a security alert. Interviews during the investigation revealed that there were 47 secure or lockdown events at the school between February 2022 and the shooting in May; 90 percent of those events were related to bailouts.
Weak and spotty WiFi coverage made accessibility to the Internet unreliable for communication and alerts.

Robb Elementary used Raptor Technologies, an emergency management alert system that uses a mobile phone application, to send security and emergency alerts to faculty and staff.

Poor cell phone service coverage, and habits of staff leaving mobile phones off, might also have contributed to a lack of awareness of security alerts that were issued by school officials.

“The committee received evidence that Uvalde CISD employees did not always reliably receive the Raptor alerts,” according to the report. “Reasons included poor Wi-Fi coverage, phones that were turned off or not always carried, and employees who had to log-in on a computer to receive a message.”  Again, this is problematic due to the inadequate WiFi.

Furthermore, no one used the school’s intercom system to alert teachers and students of the active shooter incident.
The committee added that “...had school personnel locked the doors as the school’s policy required, that could have slowed the shooter's progress for a few precious minutes—long enough to receive alerts, hide children, and lock doors; and long enough to give police more opportunity to engage and stop the attacker before he could massacre 19 students and two teachers.”
It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that properly locking and working doors would have prevented the shooter entering room 211, where most of the lives were lost.

There was one School Resource Officer (SRO - A specially trained law enforcement officer) assigned to cover six schools. He was off campus as the shooting began.

Left of Bang - Nashville
The Covenant School is a small Christian School in a quiet suburb of Nashville. It generally serves about 200 students with a small staff of teachers and administrators. Despite the small size of the school, they had taken certain steps that saved lives.

In January of 2022, Covenant School engaged the services of a security consulting firm. With the guidance of a competent security firm, they engaged in active shooter training and conducted active shooter drills.

A few months later in March or April, the security consulting firm returned to train the teachers and staff in First Aid for Trauma and Stop the Bleed.
As a result of their training and preparation, the staff, teachers and even the students remained calm during the event.

The quick thinking and actions of each group of individuals, from the staff to the students to law enforcement, all played a role in successfully minimizing the loss of life.

The security consulting firm conducted a review of the shooting and determined that the staff, teachers and students at the school had successfully implemented their training in this event. This included locking and barricading the doors, covering windows, turning out the lights, and moving the children to a designated safe portion of the room away from potential gun fire.

The consultant noted that a medical bag was out and available for use if needed.

Covenant School had separately contracted with a private security firm for a presence at the school.
The main failure at the school was that the front doors were made of un-reinforced glass. The shooter gained entry by shooting out the glass in the doors and simply walking through the empty frames.
There was no School Resource Officer (SRO - A specially trained armed law enforcement officer) assigned to the school.

Bang
Bang - Uvalde
Prior to the day of the event, the shooter, 18 years old, had legally obtained firearms and a significant cache of ammunition.
The morning of the attack, the shooter shot his grandmother at her home, stole her truck, and was driving towards the school, when he crashed it into a ditch outside the school.

Two men at a nearby funeral home saw the wreckage and made their way towards the truck. But the attacker emerged and began shooting at them, causing them to flee.

The attacker then left the scene, carrying a backpack and a rifle. He made his way down the street and hopped a perimeter fence around the school.
Numerous people saw the attacker crash his vehicle and enter the school. They called 911 and alerted school personnel via radio.
One of the officers first arriving on the scene saw a dark figure near students across the school field and thinking it was the shooter, called command to request permission to shoot at the figure.

Command failed to respond and the officer never fired. It was a good thing. That figure was a coach guiding the students off the field and to safety.
Law enforcement, nearly 400 of them, responded rapidly. But no one took charge of the scene. Details were miscommunicated.
 77 minutes passed, during which the attacker made his way through the school, opened a classroom door, and shot and killed 19 students and two teachers.

“Despite the immediate presence of local law enforcement leaders, there was an unacceptably long period of time before officers breached the classroom, neutralized the attacker, and began rescue efforts,”

The first law enforcement officials on the scene at Robb Elementary were the commander of the Uvalde Police Department SWAT team and the Chief of the School District Police.

While the school District Police Chief was to assume command of the active shooter response—according to the district’s written active shooter plan—he did not perform those duties, nor did he assign them to another individual.
No one else assumed the role to provide first responders inside the school with information that there were survivors still inside with the gunman.
Since the Columbine school shooting in 1999, the best practice for active shooter response by law enforcement is to immediately prioritize engaging the shooter.

Despite this, law enforcement at Robb Elementary did not follow their training. They instead treated the incident as a ‘barricade situation’.
“Correcting this error should have sparked greater urgency to immediately breach the classroom by any possible means, to subdue the attacker, and to deliver immediate aid to surviving victims,” the committee wrote. “Recognition of an active shooter scenario also should have prompted responders to prioritize the rescue of innocent victims over the precious time wasted in a search for door keys and shields to enhance the safety of law enforcement responders.”
“Despite the immediate presence of local law enforcement leaders, there was an unacceptably long period of time before officers breached the classroom, neutralized the attacker, and began rescue efforts,” the committee wrote. “We do not know at this time whether responders could have saved more lives by shortening that delay. Regardless, law enforcement committed numerous mistakes in violation of current active shooter training, and there are important lessons to be learned from each faulty assumption and poor decision made that day.”
“We found systematic failures and egregiously poor decision making.”

Bang - Nashville

10:10 - Shooter fires rounds through the glass doors of the school’s side entrance, gains entry
10:13 - Additional shots were fired, and a call to 911 was made.
10:13 - The shooter walks through a school hallway. For several minutes, the shooter walks around outside a church office, enters, exits, and then passes the children’s ministry.
10:21 - Shooter fires shots before walking out of the video frame. The first responding officers arrived on campus.
The shooter walks down the hall(s) trying the doors of classrooms in sequence while walking. The doors are locked. The shooter is denied entry and walks on.
10:23 - The first officers enter the school. Police body-worn camera footage shows officers going room to room looking for the shooter, clearing classrooms, and speeding past at least one body in a hallway.
10:24 - A team of five officers arrived on the second level and immediately followed the sound of gunfire toward the shooter, again, according to police body-worn camera footage.
10:25 - Two officers engaged the suspect.
10:27 - The suspected shooter is declared dead.

What can we learn from these two events, that are similar in nature, but differ in their outcomes?

Comparing the two schools, how staff and first responders prepared for and responded to the events is strikingly different.  

In the left of bang phase, Robb Elementary in Uvalde was a cascade of failures. They had a plan, but it was completely neglected. The school had a five foot fence, which marked the boundaries of the property, but provided no security. Doors were intentionally left unlocked or ajar for convenience, and/or the door locks did not work properly at all. Communication systems were in place, but were inadequate, faulty, or in the case of cell phones, left unattended or turned off.  There was not a clear plan of how to communicate to teachers, staff and law enforcement that a threat event was in progress. They failed to adequately and effectively practice, drill and rehearse what steps to take in case of such an event.

The Covenant School on the other hand had effectively planned, drilled and rehearsed what each individual would do in the event of an attack. An alarm (aside from the gun shots) sounded and everyone responded according to their plan. Students were ushered inside or away from the shooting, doors were locked and barricaded, students were moved to a pre-planned safe space in the room out of the line of fire, window shades were pulled down to deny vision to the shooter, lights were turned off, and everyone remained calm. Calls to 911 were made. Medical bags were made ready in case of need.

The one fatal flaw in The Covenant School’s plan and execution was the failure to install bullet resistant film to the glass doors and other glass as needed. Bullet resistant film will not stop a high powered bullet from penetrating and passing through the glass, but it is remarkably effective at holding the glass in place.
Studies and demonstrations have shown that where the bullet resistant film is installed, it takes the shooter 3-5 minutes to clear a hole through the glass big enough to gain entry. From the time the first shots were fired and 911 was called at 10:13, officers arrived within 8 minutes at 10:21. That 3-5 minutes that the film would have denied entry to the shooter was precious time that would have allowed staff and teachers to clear the hallways keeping the children and themselves safe behind locked doors. Just as importantly, the time between the shooter beginning the attack and the time the officers arrived would have cut the time the shooter spent inside the school to potentially under 3 minutes. Combined these effects just might have saved the six lives that were lost.
The Bang phase of the attacks also stand strikingly in contrast to one another.

The Robb Elementary School response by first responders was a disaster. Law enforcement was in total disarray, lacking a unified command and failed to follow the school district plan, let alone their own departments’ policies and guidelines.  Law enforcement showed up lacking the equipment needed and failed to don adequate body armor and protective gear. One of the Chiefs managed to lose his communication device between his car and the school. It could be compared to one of the Keystone Cops films, had the outcome not been so horrific.

The Bang phase at The Covenant School shooting event was the exact opposite. The school had developed a well thought out plan. They had practiced and drilled on the various aspects of just such an event. Because they knew what to do, and what each other was expected to do, they remained calm. They executed their plan and kept the vast majority of the children safe.

The response of the Nashville Metropolitan Police Department was exemplary. The first officers that showed up on the scene were not highly trained specialists. They were regular patrol officers for the most part. Despite this fact, they donned their body armor and protective equipment, and efficiently gathered the other items they would need. They quickly split into two teams, each with only one designated in command and in communication with the other team, along with other officers and commanders arriving on the scene.

Outside Covenant School, two school staff members greeted the law enforcement teams. The first one informed the officers what had transpired, that she believed there was only one shooter, and where she believed the officers could locate the shooter. The second staff member provided the keys the officers would need, and further information they might need.

Upon entering the school, the two teams of officers began efficiently and effectively clearing offices and rooms. From the videos captured by their body cameras, it appeared that they moved in complete coordination, as one might expect from a special forces team that trains extensively. They were in fact very well trained and acted completely professionally.

Where the shooter at Robb Elementary had 77 minutes to kill 19 children and two teachers, the shooter at The Covenant School had only 17 minutes from the first shot to being neutralized.

One other point should be noted. Had either school had a well trained and armed School Resource Officer present at the school, either shooting might have ended sooner with less, if any loss of innocent life. Active shooters are not typically looking for a gun fight. They tend to avoid them in general. Active shooters are typically looking for maximum impact - they want to create maximum loss of life and injury to ensure their notoriety.

Tennessee has one of the best planned and executed school safety programs in the country. I know, because I have four grandchildren in K-12 public schools there. The morning of the Covenant School shooting my daughter called me and asked: “Daddy, do I have to be afraid to send my children to school?” I was able to reassure her that her children, my grandchildren, are safe at school.

Tennessee had enacted Bills that that provide funding for public schools to have an SRO on the grounds at all times. In fact, my grandchildren have up to 3 SRO’s in their buildings at all times. I have been there when my daughter had to pick up a child from school. Despite the fact that she is well known there, she must approach the entrance of the school where the doors are made of steel and without windows. She stands outside, in front of a video/audio screen and shows her I.D., which is vetted against school records to ensure there are no custody issues. She is then admitted to a second area with another set of steel doors, where she is allowed  entry to a holding room. Her child is brought out to her. She never enters the school. The school is surrounded by high fences. There is one way in and out, and that entry is closely monitored. Tennessee also mandates that there are Behavioral Threat Assessment teams at schools. (A vital topic to be discussed in a subsequent writing.)

Law enforcement officers are mandated by the State to undergo active shooter training at the academy, and even private security officers who serve at Tennessee school are required to undergo active shooter training by Public Acts Chapter 367 (2023)
Tennessee had one flaw in its legislation. Private schools (i.e. religious schools) were not covered under legislation existing at the time of the Covenant School shooting. Therefore, The Covenant School did not have an armed SRO on the grounds. In the short time since the shooting, the Tennessee legislature has  passed legislation and the Governor signed into law provisions that provide funding to include private schools to have access to the same protections as public schools. Going forward, private schools will have SROs on campus.

Tennessee wasted no time responding effectively with the legislation needed to correct the situation and further protect its children. Following the tragic Covenant shooting, Gov. Lee worked with the General Assembly to enhance his legislation and increase funding in the Fiscal Year 23-24 budget to place an armed School Resource Officer (SRO) at every Tennessee public school, boost physical school security at public and private schools, and provide additional mental health resources for Tennesseans.

In Texas, over the past year since the Uvalde shooting, the legislature passed  HB3, or House Bill 3. This new law will give school districts an extra $10 per student, plus $15,000 per campus, every year for school safety upgrades. Another $1.1 billion in grants will help schools meet new facility requirements from the Texas Education Agency, for a total of at least $1.4 billion.

There are a host of other reforms included in the Texas Bill: New regional education service centers, using materials from the Texas School Safety Center, will help schools come up with emergency plans. Every campus in Texas will receive an annual security audit funded by the state. School Security Officers will participate in active shooter training every four years, and the safety center will re-evaluate best practices every five years.
It is a start… sort of. These types of skills are perishable and need to be drilled more than once every four or five years to be at all effective. In 4-5 years, much has been forgotten, not to mention the loss of experience. just from turnover of staff.
The bill requires at least one armed security officer on each campus during regular school hours. The state will also conduct a vulnerability assessment of each school district randomly every four years and issue recommendations afterward.

One year later, the bill is still awaiting Governor Abbot’s signature.

In closing, it should be noted that there is a huge area of active shooter prevention that has not been addressed in this writing. That is the immensely vital need to have well trained Multi-disciplinary Behavioral Threat Assessment Teams within the schools, their districts, law enforcement and the communities at large.

Behavioral Threat Assessment is NOT about turning students of concern over to the legal system, or expelling them from school. Studies have shown that, those steps should only be utilized as a last resort, or when needed to prevent an immediate, or impending threat of violence. Even then, they don’t always eliminate the threat.  

Law enforcement officers are included on threat assessment teams, but formal law enforcement actions were reserved for the most serious cases. A small percentage of students were, arrested (0.7%), or placed in juvenile detention (0.1%) following a threat assessment.

Behavioral Threat Assessment is more akin to a ‘wellness program.‘ It provides us the means to identify students who are on the pathway to violence, and allows us to assess their concerns and situations, address their grievances and needs, and assist them to get off the pathway to violence and onto a pathway to a healthy life. In addition, Behavioral Threat Assessment Teams are well equipped to identify and assist students at risk for suicide.  In each case, using Behavioral Threat Assessment Teams, we may just save their lives, and in doing so, other lives might be saved as well.
Behavioral Threat Assessment  is a vitally important topic, and requires much more discussion than can be addressed in this paper.  This topic will be explored at another time, as it is a pivotal key to real prevention of school shootings.

Recently, the FBI published “Making Prevention a Reality - Identifying, Assessing, and Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks.” It is a masterful guide in the step by step creation, management and use of Behavioral Threat Assessment Teams in the education environment. It is highly recommended reading for anyone interested in learning more on the subject.  This guide can be accessed at the following link: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf/view

What we have discussed here has to do with protecting innocent children while at school. What needs to follow is how we assist students - who may be progressing toward targeted violence - with what they need to prevent their desperate vision of violence and often their own death as the only solution to what troubles them.

We need to help them find solutions that lead to a healthier and violence free life.

If we take action and accomplish that, perhaps we save THAT student’s life.

And in the process… we may never have to know how many other lives might have been spared.
* * * * *

Author’s note: A little over 1 month after the Covenant School Shooting, a shooter brought firearms to a Jewish school in Memphis, Tennessee with the intent of committing a shooting and potentially taking the lives of students and staff. His plans were thwarted when he was unable to gain access to the school. The school had created a comprehensive school safety plan and committed to putting all of the pieces in place. Frustrated in his attempts to enter the school buildings, he fired four rounds in the parking lot, injuring no one. When police located him later, he chose to shoot it out with police. He was shot and critically injured by police.

* * * * *

Brett Modesti is Education Sector Chief for FBI/InfraGard, with an Area of Responsibility covering seven counties in southern to central California. His duties include educating and advising K-12 and higher education schools on active shooter prevention and response. In this capacity he coordinates with law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, U.S. Secret Service, Joint Regional Intelligence Center, Los Angeles Sheriffs Department, Los Angeles Police Department, and other local agencies.

He is a DHS/CISA certified instructor for C.R.A.S.E. (Civilian Response to Active Shooter Events), ALERRT (Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training), CISA OBP BMAP Liaison Officer (Bomb Making Materials Awareness Program), and is a  certified Situational Awareness Professional - Advanced Practioner. Brett is a Firearms Instructor and Chief Range Safety Officer certified by NRA / CRPA / and USCCA and has taught numerous guns safety courses as well as Personal Defense, Defensive Handgun, and Tactical Defense. He is a graduate of the FBI Citizens Academy; and the LAPD Community Police Academy.

Brett is a member of FBI/InfraGard . ASIS . IAHSS . ATAP (Association of Threat Assessment Professionals) . FBI Citizens Academy Alumni.

The Gift of Fear

True fear is a gift.
Unwarranted fear is a curse.
Learn how to tell the difference.

A stranger in a deserted parking lot offers to help carry a woman's groceries. Is he a good Samaritan, or is he after something else? A fired employee says "You'll be sorry". Will he return with a gun? After their first date, a man tells a woman it is their "destiny" to be married. What will he do when she won't see him again? A mother has an uneasy feeling about the nice babysitter she's just hired. Should she not go to work today?

These days, no one in America feels immune to violence. But now, in this extraordinary, groundbreaking book, the nation's leading expert on predicting violent behavior unlocks the puzzle of human violence and shows that, like every creature on earth, we have within us the ability to predict the harm others might do us and get out of its way. Contrary to popular myth, human violence almost always has a discernible motive and is preceded by clear warning signs.

Through dozens of compelling examples from his own career, Gavin de Becker teaches us how to read the signs, using our most basic but often most discounted survival skill - our intuition. The Gift of Fear is a remarkable, unique combination of practical guidance on leading a safer life and profound insight into human behavior.

Gavin de Becker is the nation’s leading expert on predicting violent behavior. In this groundbreaking book he unlocks the puzzle of human violence and shows that, like every creature on earth, we have within us the ability to predict danger—and get out of its way. Through dozens of compelling examples, de Becker teaches us how to use our most basic, too-often discounted survival skill—our intuition. The Gift of Fear is at once a profoundly insightful exploration of human behavior and a uniquely practical guide to leading a safer life, more free of unwarranted fear.

In this empowering book, Gavin de Becker, the man Oprah Winfrey calls the nation's leading expert on violent behavior, shows you how to spot even subtle signs of danger—before it's too late. Shattering the myth that most violent acts are unpredictable, de Becker, whose clients include top Hollywood stars and government agencies, offers specific ways to protect yourself and those you love, including...how to act when approached by a stranger...when you should fear someone close to you...what to do if you are being stalked...how to uncover the source of anonymous threats or phone calls...the biggest mistake you can make with a threatening person...and more. Learn to spot the danger signals others miss. It might just save your life.

Making Prevention a Reality

Preventing Targeted Violence or Active Shooters IS possible! In fact, in recent years in schools alone, over 2,000 school shootings were averted!

A study of these averted shootings vs. events where the shooters planned events where actually occurred reveals startling and valuable isight in understanding how to intervene and prevent these tragic events.

Central to the prevention of Targeted Violence is the advent of Behavioral Threat Assessment (BTA). Persons of Concern follow a well described Pathway to Violence. Along that pathway, ‘leakage’, or broadcasting their intended violent event.

Behavioral Threat Assessment teams are multi-disciplinary team of trained professionals who use a defined process of evaluating information reported related to ‘leakage’ from the person of interest. They then determine the credibility of the threat, and where indicated, intervene to help take the person of interest of of the pathway to violence, and on to a healthier pathway to living a successful life.

Making Prevention a Reality lays out a blueprint to creating, and effectively operating a Behavioral Threat Assessment Teams.

“The FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) held a symposium in mid-2015, bringing together academic researchers, mental health experts, and law enforcement practitioners of threat assessment to discuss the active shooter phenomenon. Specifically, symposium participants focused on prevention strategies with regard to this crime problem. By far the most valuable prevention strategy identified was the threat assessment and management team. The good news is that every organization and community has the potential to stand up or access such a team” - from Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing and Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks - U.S. Dept of Justice / Federal Bureau of Investigation